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Fifth Canadian Armoured Division:
Introduction to Battle
Bill McAndrew

T

he Canadian government authorized the
formation of lst Canadian Armoured
Division (CAD) early in 1941. It organized at
Camp Borden in March and, redesignated 5th
CAD, sailed for the United Kingdom in the fall. 1
Originally its organization was based on two
armoured brigades (each of three regiments, a
motor battalion and a support group composed
of a field regiment, a Light Anti-Aircraft (LAA)
regiment, an anti-tank regiment and an infantry
battalion). In light of operational experience
with armour in North Mrica the organization
was subsequently changed; an armoured
brigade was changed for one of infantry (three
battalions), and the support group was modified
to include two field regiments (one selfpropelled) along with the anti -aircraft and antitank units. In addition, there were a motor
battalion of infantry, a reconnaissance
regiment, two Royal Canadian Engineer (RCE)
squadrons and the usual support and
administrative units. Once this phase of the
division's reorganization was completed, 5th
CAD's two brigades were 5 Canadian Armoured
Brigade (CAB) (the Strathconas, British
Columbia Dragoons, the 8th New Brunswick
Hussars and the Westminster Regiment as a
motorized infantry battalion), and ll Canadian
Infantry Brigade (CIB) (The Perth Regiment,
the Cape Breton Highlanders and the Irish
Regiment of Canada). The Governor General's
Horse Guards formed the reconnaissance
regiment, and artillery support came from the
17th Field, 8th Field (Self-Propelled), 4th AntiTank and 5th LAA Regiments.

Equipping the division was a slow, drawn
out process. By the end of July 1942, 5 CAB
had received only 40 per cent of its tanks, a
motley mixture of American General Lees and
Stuarts, along with a few Canadian-built Rams
which were to be the formation's main battle
tank. Not for another year were sufficient
Rams available to fill the divisional
establishment and, as a result, training
suffered. Individual and specialist training
went on continuously, and some troop
movement and range practice was possible,
but the division itself did not take to the field
until it participated in the Army-level Exercise
"Spartan" in February-March 1943.
Mterwards, units were introduced to infantrytank cooperation drills, but little emphasis
seems to have been given the topic, and while
the pace of training picked up it was
intermittent. The division's operational
readiness remained questionable. 2
The division was initially to participate in
the campaign then being planned for Northwest Europe. Within a month of the l st
Canadian Infantry Division's landing in Sicily
in July 1943, however, the Canadian
government proposed to the British Chiefs of
Staff that a second division along with a
Canadian Corps Headquarters be sent to the
Mediterranean for battle experience. The British
were at first reluctant but after considerable
negotiation agreed to switch their 30 Corps
Headquarters with l Canadian, and the 7th
(Desert Rats) Armoured Division with 5th CAD.
43
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5th Canadia,n Armoured Division
Ang1l~tl944

Major-General G. G. Simonds (1 Nov 1943 to 29 Jan 1944)
Major-General E.L.M. Burns (30 Jan 1944 to 19 March 1944)
Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister (20 March 1944 to 6 June 1945)
5 Armoured Brigade

11 Infantry Brigade

12 Infantry Brigade

2nd Armoured Regiment
(Lord Strathcona's Horse
(Royal Canadians))

11th Independent Machine Gun
Company
(The Princess Louise Fusiliers)

12th Independent Machine
Gun Company
(The Princess Louise Fusiliers)

5th Armoured Regiment
(8th Princess Louise's
(New Brunswick) Hussars)

The Perth Regiment

4th Princess Louise Dragoon
Guards

9th Armoured Regiment
(The British Columbia
Dragoons)

The Cape Breton Highlanders
The Irish Regiment

The Lanark and Renfrew
Scottish Regiment
The Westminster Regiment
(Motor)

Divisional Troops
3rd Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment
(The Governor General's Horse Guard)

17th Field, 8th Field (Self-Propelled), 4th AntiTank and 5th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiments, RCA

1st, lOth Field & 4th Field Park Squadrons, RCE

5th Armoured Divisional Signals

The units sailed in November, some to North
Africa, others direct to Italy, and by the end
year were being concentrated, equipped and
acclimated before being assigned operational
responsibilities. 3
As had been the case in Britain, equipment
shortages hampered training and delayed the
operational deployment of the division. Fifth
CAD left its Ram tanks in England for 7th
Armoured in exchange for the heavier-gunned
Shermans which were now standard in the
Mediterranean. General Guy Simonds, its new
General Officer Commanding (GOC). decided
to await the arrival in Italy of newer gasolinepowered models to replace older diesel
Shermans, and the rest of the Desert Rats
vehicles were found to be well beyond their
useful mechanical lives. Replacements arrived
slowly. By the end of the year, for instance, the
British Columbia Dragoons had obtained 87

wheeled vehicles, including some Daimler and
White scout cars, but no tanks at all. In
February, 11 Honey reconnaissance tanks
(stripped down Stuarts) were issued and soon
after the first Shermans appeared, allowing
crews finally to familiarize themselves with
their new weapons. 4
Meanwhile units were introduced to
operations piecemeal. Not long after their
arrival in Italy, sappers from 10 Field Squadron
were committed to construct a bridge over a
tributary of the Sangro River in support of the
2nd New Zealand Division. Despite the
inadequacies of their inherited vehicles and
equipment, the squadron was able to complete
a high level crossing in a week and then
remained in the sector on maintenance and
mine clearing tasks until the end of the year.
The other squadron, No. 1, was also called
forward and obtained its first experience
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Troops of the Cape Breton Highlanders being piped of{ the ship
upon their arrival in Italy. 8 November 1943.

clearing mines under fire while supporting 1st
Canadian Armoured Brigade, which had
accompanied 1st Division to the Mediterranean
earlier in the year.
The infantry's introduction to actual
operations was less auspicious. In December,
Simonds, impressed that 11 Brigade was
"steaming ahead," asked that it be sent forward
by the end of the month "to get its first
experience of contact with the enemy." 5 Early
in January 1944 it was placed under command
of 1st Division and relieved its 3 Brigade in the
line along the Arielli River north of Ortona. At
this time the Adriatic front had stabilized into

(NAC)

fixed winter lines. The Allied High Command
was preparing major offensives at Cassino and
Anzio and wished to prevent the Germans from
reinforcing those fronts. Eleven Brigade was
thus ordered to mount a limited holding attack
across the Arielli to maintain pressure. Its
assault on 17 January- successively by the
Perths and the Cape Bretons, each with a
squadron of tanks - went in across open
ground in daylight against well-prepared riverline defences manned by experienced veterans
of the German 1st Parachute Division. The
combination of a disjointed plan, inexperienced
units and strong defences produced a dismal
failure. None of the objectives were secured.
45
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The cost of the operation was eight officer and
177 other rank casualties, which prompted
Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German
Commander-in-Chief, to comment, 'The trial
runs of green troops are nothing famous." 6
Its morale down, 11 Brigade was quickly
withdrawn from the line to recover. Three days
later it was placed under command of the 4th
Indian Division (along with the Strathconas
and Westminsters) and assigned a fairly quiet
sector of the defensive line. It was still in this
position in early February when 5th CAD HQ
relieved the Indians and assumed its first
operational role. Then, as part of a general
regrouping, the division shifted eastward to
join 1st Division under command of the
Canadian Corps. 7
The division's preparation for active
operations had been somewhat less than
complete. It did not have an opportunity to
function as a formation since its arrival in
Italy, and equipment shortages severely limited
unit training. Further, there was a notable
lack of continuity in its command and staff
structure during these first few months in the
Mediterranean. At the end of 1943 General
Simonds returned to the United Kingdom to be
replaced by Major-General E.L.M. Burns. In
March, Burns succeeded General Crerar as
Corps Commander and Brigadier B.M.
Hoffmeister became 5th CAD's third
commander in as many months. In the same
period both 5 Armoured and 11 Infantry
Brigades received new Brigadiers, and at
divisional headquarters a new CRA
[Commander, Royal Artillery] (Brigadier H.A.
Sparling). GSO I [General Staff Officer I] and
AA&QMG
[Assistant
Adjutant
and
Quartermaster General] took up their duties. 8
In noting the army historian's view that the
division "still had something to learn about
armour in battle," Burns commented later that
"This was a considerable understatement, as I
think most of the officers and men who arrived
at the fighting front in the winter of 1943-44
would agree. "9
By the time the Canadian Corps became
operational in February 1944, the character of
the Italian campaign had changed markedly.
The Allies had been able to advance rapidly

through Sicily and southern Italy- Fifth (US)
Army in the west, Eighth (BR) Army to the east
- but then were stopped on a line stretched
across the country south of Rome by a
combination of determined resistance and
winter mud. In mid-January the first of a
number of bitter attempts to unhinge the
German defences foundered at Cassino, and a
month later the enemy successfully contained
Fifth Army's attempt to outflank their positions
with an amphibious landing at Anzio. Field
Marshal Harold Alexander, Commander of the
18th Army Group, therefore, decided to call a
halt to his offensive operations in order to
prepare a full scale assault in the spring to
destroy the German army south of Rome and
liberate the capital. As it eventually matured,
his plan called for a two-pronged attack. Fifth
and Eighth Armies would break through from
the South-east, the former along the coast and
through the mountains, the latter driving
through the valley of the Liri River, the
traditional, relatively open, main route to Rome.
Then, when the German commander had been
forced to commit his reserves, the Allied forces
at Anzio would break out, meet the others and
isolate the defenders. 10
There were few commanding precedents to
guide planning for the coming offensive. Until
then, for the most part, fighting in Sicily and
Italy had been from the line of march in an
extended advance to contact against continual
delaying actions. Now, with the front stabilized,
a major set-piece attack was needed to loosen
it up once more. Eighth Army had had
considerable experience with set-piece attacks,
of course, but over terrain significantly different
than the Italian where a succession of rivers,
defiles and mountains ran across the grain of
the advance, restricting movement and
reinforcing the natural superiority of the
defence. When Crerar and Burns first saw the
winter lines they were reminded more of the
Western Front they had known a generation
earlier than of North Africa, and both were
convinced that, lacking room for manoeuvre,
massive firepower on the First World War
model would be required to break the stalemate.
Thus, while the tactical principles for the
forthcoming attack were not new, there was a
need to rethink them and determine how best
they might be applied in the circumstances.
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A Shennan tank of the Second Annoured Regiment (Lord Strathcona's Horse (RC)).

(LdSH(RC) Museum)
Following that the troops, units and formations
had to be trained to execute them.
The Canadian Corps undertook a concerted
training programme in the spring to prepare
for the resumption of mobile warfare. Army,
Corps and Divisional schools were opened for
all manner of specialist and unit training.
Sappers gave instruction in assault river
crossing, mine clearing and pioneer work;
gunners fired on impromptu ranges and many
attended the Eighth Army School of Artillery;
units sent cadres for muleteer and mountain
fighting courses; armoured units did range
firing, and infantry units tried to shed the
mould accumulated after a lengthy period in
trenches. While lst Division remained in the
line its brigades rotated through reserve and
training periods. When Hoffmeister assumed
command of 5th CAD it was already in reserve;
he stepped up the training pace, emphasizing
particularly the need for all-arms cooperation. 11

Unfamiliarity with the strengths and
limitations of other arms and services was
perhaps the most common of training
weaknesses. Eleven Brigade'sArielli operation
had revealed one aspect of the problem, when
the reluctance of forward infantry companies
to "lean on" their artillery support allowed the
German defenders to man their positions and
inflict serious casualties. To counter this,
Hoffmeister and his staff quickly organized a
series of unit live firing exercises, on which the
GOC insisted on accompanying the lead
platoons to demonstrate how close troops can
safely follow their supporting gunfire. 12
The most effective means of employing
armour, and the coordination of tank and
infantry fire and movement, was the other
principal concern. Before Burns left England
for Italy, Montgomery had told him that "There
is no role for an armoured division in Italy."
But it was there, and he at the corps level and
47
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Hoffmeister at the divisional level had to make
do as best they could to adapt prevailing
doctrine to their peculiar circumstances. That
doctrine, laid down in the manual The Tactical
Handling of the Armoured Division, had not
been written with Italy in mind. 13 The armoured
division was intended as "a mounted hardhitting formation primarily constituted for use
against hastily prepared enemy defences, for
exploitation of initial success gained by other

armoured force. For maximum effect, the
armoured division needed room for manoeuvre,
and "Its full power will only be exerted by the
employment of its armour concentrated, and
supported by all the other components of the
division." 15 Then, "By envelopment, or by deep
penetration through (the enemy's) defences
after a gap has been made in his main position
by other formations," 16 the armoured division
could become the "Expanding Torrent"

Scout Cars in Harbour.
Daimlers of the Fifth Canadian Armoured Brigade Headquarters Squadron outside town ofPignataro Maggiore,
Italy. 10 May 1944. From a watercolour from L.P. Harris.
(CWM no.l2717)

formations, and for pursuit." 14 Mobility and
fire-power made its mere presence a threat by
forcing the enemy continually to alter his own
dispositions in anticipation of the unexpected
appearance on the battlefield of a large

envisaged by Liddell Hart and practised in
blitzkrieg.
There were precious few regions in the
enclosed, obstacle ridden Italian countryside,
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however, where standard doctrine might be
applied. As the units of 7th Armoured Division
found on arriving from North Mrica, "Gone
forever were the days of free manoeuvre in the
Desert, of fast movement from one flank to
another . . . . Now, they had to drive down
narrow roads with ditches on both sides until
a burst of fire at the leading car revealed the
enemy's position." 17 Rather than armoured
formations being deployed in classic cavalry
fashion as "the rapier in the hands of the
higher commander, "18 ready to exploit initial
success, tanks had to be employed primarily to
supplement artillery fire in support of infantry,
with units usually decentralized on a squadron/
troop basis with battalions and companies. As
a formation, the armoured division in Italy was
unbalanced; the force of its armour could
seldom be concentrated, yet with only one
infantry brigade it could not be fought like an
ordinary infantry division. When employing
5th CAD, consequently, Hoffmeister had
continually to strike a pragmatic compromise
between doctrinal theory and the realities of
the ground over which he had to operate. In
any case, the circumstances placed the highest
premium on developing battle-tested drills for
infantry /tank cooperation so the two arms
could provide maximum mutual support.
The theory of infantry-tank cooperation
was simple enough to assert - tanks
neutralized enemy wire and machine-guns
while the infantry dealt with his mines and
anti-tank guns- but its efficient practice was
another matter. "The general conception of the
attack is a mutual co-operative advance against
the objective," 19 but ground and the tactical
situation made each tactical problem unique.
Whether tanks should lead or follow the
infantry, and whether they might provide
support by accompanying them or with
supporting fire from a distance, were open
questions which no established doctrine could
answer conclusively. The two arms had to
learn how to communicate with each other,
however, for as one contemporary noted, "Apart
from insufficient opportunity for preliminary
co-operative training between infantry and
tanks that are to operate together, the major
obstacle to co-operation at the moment is the
failure to achieve really satisfactory and reliable
means of intercommunication between infantry

and tanks in battle. "20 Or, as another Canadian
armoured unit described the problem from
below:
In this country with tankvs tank or tank vs anti-tank
gun, the attacker is at a disadvantage. It is therefore
necessary to spot the anti-tank gun or tank first.
This can only be done by the Troop Leader moving
forward from fire position to fire position on foot. The
enemy can be also spotted and destroyed by the
tanks, aided by the infantry as "eyes." This condition
only exists where a Squadron has been working and
fighting for a considerable period of time, with the
same regiment, commanded by a commander who
thinks of and has a knowledge of tanks, and imbibes
this spirit of co-operation and confidence into his
Company commanders. 21

Effective battlefield drills could only come
through intensive integrated training, and when
he turned over command of 5 CAB to J.D.B.
Smith in February 1944, Brigadier G.R.
Bradbrooke pointed to some serious deficiencies
in the division's infantry-tank tactical practice.
Both infantry and armoured commanders had
confided to him their impressions of having
been let down by the other. Their attitudes, he
judged, had stemmed from mutual ignorance
of the other's methods and capabilities. In the
attack, infantry wanted tanks right with them
and were extremely reluctant to move forward
when the tanks became separated or were
stopped; tankers complained that the infantry
failed to appreciate the impossibility of their
maintaining intimate contact while moving
over broken ground and, moreover, that they
could provide gun fire support just as effectively
from long range. The infantry also wanted
tanks with them in defence, especially in the
period before their own anti-tank weapons got
forward; tankers objected that the infantry
were reluctant to give them close protection in
forward positions at night when they were
blind and most vulnerable. Both arms
recognized the need for better target indication
to enhance their mutual support. 22
Divisional Headquarters delegated 5 CAB
to study the problem and organize a training
programmetomeetit. In February, the Brigade
staff conducted a cloth model exercise and
discussion for infantry and tank unit
commanders, and followed in March with a
series of TEWTs [Tactical Exercise Without
Troops]. first for squadron/company
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commanders, then for Captains and subalterns
in both the armoured and infantry brigades.
These covered all phases of all-arms
cooperation; communications (it was at this
time that the tank -mounted infantry telephone
was first tried); target indication; deployment
drills, orders of march and battle procedure;
how ground and the tactical situation would
dictate when tanks and when the infantry
should lead; use of supporting weapons and
fire; night protection; mutual support;
command and control. Theory was then put
into practice when squadrons and companies
were brought into common bivouacs, where
they might familiarize themselves with the
other arm's equipments, before moving through
dry then live firing exercises with all weapons. 23
A divisional exercise completed the cycle.
Designed to train the headquarters and both
brigades in deploying from a concentration
area and mounting a set-piece attack, it gave
particular stress to joint reconnaissance and
planning, as well as staff drills for movement
and traffic control, and passing information. 24
Unfortunately it was the only divisional level
exercise as the concentrated training period
was disrupted when 11 Brigade was detached
for a month's tour in the line near Cassino, this
time under New Zealand command. Five CAB
and the other divisional units continued
training, but it is impossible to gauge its
effectiveness. As is usually the case, some
units no doubt profited more from the
opportunity than others. Moreover, the
difficulties a new commander and staff faced in
fusing an efficient fighting armoured division
in difficult circumstances cannot be gainsaid.
Nevertheless, by the time 11 Brigade returned
to the fold early in May, the division was
already preparing for its first action as a
formation; an assault against the Gustav and
Hitler Lines in the Liri River valley South-west
of Rome.
Eighth Army's front in the four-to-seven
mile wide, east-west Liri Valley was dominated
by Mount Cairo on the North (Monte Cassino is
a spur) and the Aurunci range to the South.
Through the northern side of the valley ran
Highway 6, the main Naples-Rome road, and
across the valley the Germans had constructed
two very formidable defensive positions; the

Gustav Line situated at the eastern end and,
further on, the Hitler Line. A number of Liri
tributaries meandered across the front, all
running against the grain of the advance, and
forming serious natural obstacles which were
thickened with minefields, pill boxes, dug in
tank turrets, wire and machine-guns. General
Leese's (who succeeded Montgomery at Eighth
Army in December 1943) first objective was
Cassino, a task he gave to the Polish Corps.
Then, XIII Corps was to assault across the
Rapido river at the base of Cassino, form a
bridgehead which would breach the Gustav
Line, and gain access to Highway 6. Initially
held in reserve, the Canadian Corps had one of
two tasks in the second phase; either to pass
through the British and exploit along Highway
6, or, if the defences did not fold, as seemed
more likely, to take over the southern sector of
XIII Corps' front and break through the Hitler
Line.
The offensive got underway on 11 May and
it was soon apparent that there would be no
easy bouncing of the defences. The Poles were
unable to take Cassino quickly and on the 15th
Leese ordered Burns into the Rapido
bridgehead. Three tough days later the 1st
Division closed on the outposts, mines and
wire of the Hitler Line. Meanwhile, south of the
Liri, General Juin's North Mrican mountaintrained troops had made a spectacular advance
through trackless mountain, raising the
possibility they might outflank the Germans
fronting the Canadians and force them to
withdraw. The fleeting opportunity passed,
however, and a two-day pause ensued while
Burns moved his guns forward to support a full
set-piece attack. He planned his assault, in
conjunction with XIII Corps on his right, in two
phases; General Vokes' 1st Division would first
crack a hole in the Hitler Line position and the
5th CAD would then break out through their
gap and advance with all speed up the Liri
Valley. 25
Mter what was possibly its hardest ever
day's fighting, on 23 May, 1st Division
succeeded in gapping the Hitler Line defences.
General Hoffmeister had set up his
headquarters near Vokes' to follow the battle
and next morning his lead units began passing
through. He planned his attack in three phases

50
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which followed closely the doctrine on the
employment of armoured formations. First his
armoured brigade would move through 1st
Division, press forward quickly and seize a
bridgehead over the next obstacle, the Melfa
River, aboutsixmilesdistant. Then his infantry
brigade would take the next six mile bound to
the Liri River which it would bridge near the
town of Ceprano (where Highway 6 crossed the
Liri). Finally the armoured brigade would take
over the advance, which with luck would turn
into a pursuit before the Germans were able to
recover.
Five CAB, organized in three infantrysupported battle groups, and lead by a
Strathconas reconnaissance troop and a

company of the Westminsters, reached the
Melfa in mid -afternoon and fom1ed a bridgehead
by nightfall. [See "Battle for the Melfa River" on
page 33 for a full description of this action.]
Eleven Brigade passed through the following
morning and, although its movement stalled
during the day, it was able to get patrols across
the Liri into Ceprano during the night. It was
a good beginning for the Canadian Corps and
5th CAD. As one historian observed, after its
first day of fighting as a formation, "The
Canadian Corps was thus up to, and in one
place over, the Melfa by the end of the day, and
had every reason to be satisfied with their
success. It was the first time that the 5
(Canadian) Armoured Division had been
employed in the classic breakthrough role in

Mortars of I Canadian Corps firing at night, 6 April 1944.
(Photo by C.E. Nye/NAC PA 116819)
51
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the Italian campaign." He added, however,
that "Unfortunately, the position in the rear of
Hoffmeister's division was not so flattering. "26
Veterans of the action still speak in awe of
the confusion of tangled traffic behind the
fighting troops. The narrow five mile front
heavily favoured the defenders. The Liri valley,
hemmed in by mountains on both north and
south, was crossed against the grain by
successive rivers and defiles which were
liberally laced with mines, wire and fixed
weapons of all types. The only decent road in
the sector, Highway 6 tucked against the base
of Monte Cassino, was bitterly contested by the
Germans, and blown bridges elsewhere further
canalized traffic onto the few insubstantial dirt
tracks. In this naturally congested area, Leese
insisted on fighting his battle through two
corps headquarters. Mter the 4th British and
8th Indian Divisions had established their
Rapido bridgehead, the 78th British Division
was slipped through on Bums' right flank to
secure Highway 6 and allow the 6th South
MricanArmoured Division to conduct the main
pursuit. Bums' deployment was thus severely
restricted having to conform with XIII Corps'
progress and too many formations were
channelled into too small a space. When
opposition slowed forward progress the rear
telescoped. Moreover, when the 78th Division
was delayed by tenacious German rearguards,
their units either moved through the Canadian
sector or the inter-corps boundary was adjusted
to meet their needs. As a result, confusion
followed. Infantry support weapons, tanks,
bridging, guns and ammunition were blocked
from moving forward as priorities on the already
inadequate routes were continually and
unexpectedly changed, while word of the
changes filtered only slowly to troops and units
on the move, all making for the same few
bridges.
Consequently the final pursuit phase of the
operation was slower and less effective than
the breakthrough. When 11 Brigade moved
across the Melfa on 26 May, its own inexperience
and the ravines which separated infantry from
supporting tanks slowed its advance. They
crossed the river against light opposition on
the 27th, but then their first bridge collapsed
and badly delayed the opening of a tank route.

By then the armour of both 5th CAD and 6th
South Mrican Armoured Division were lined
up waiting to cross. Brigadier Smith eventually
moved by way of a 1st Division bridge further
South and was able to join 11 Brigade to
continue the advance on the 29th. Movement
was still hampered by rugged terrain, however,
which severely limited deployment and on the
last day of May 1st Division assumed the lead
until the Corps went into Army reserve on 4
June.
The Canadian Corps performed creditably
in its first operation, breaking through a
formidable defensive position and advancing
40 miles over very difficult country admirably
suited for delaying tactics. Yet recriminations
emerged in the aftermath. Leese was criticized
for his ponderous handling of the battle, and in
tum he found fault with Bums for moving too
slowly and failing to exercise full control of his
battlefield. Some of his criticism was justified,
as Burns acknowledged. It would have been
unusual had an untried commander and staff,
along with an untested armoured division, not
experienced difficulties in its first operation,
especially a major one like the assault on the
Hitler Line. But Leese's strictures were
overdrawn, ignoring as they did the
responsibility of his own headquarters to
manage the front on which he had deployed
two corps. He nevertheless attempted to replace
Burns with an experienced British commander
and, when that failed, to break up the Canadian
Corps. The plan was only dropped when Bums
pointed out the political implications of such a
move. Instead, within a few weeks the Corps
was assigned a major role in breaking through
the Adriatic sector to the next German defensive
barrier, the Gothic Line, stretching across the
Italian peninsula from Spezia on the west -to
Pesaro in the east. First. there was a period• for
recuperation to absorb reinforcements, as well
as the reflection and training; "time to absorb
the lessons which they had learned in the
recent fighting. "27
The Liri Valley fighting gave the Corps the
incomparable training experience which only
actual operations can provide, and there were
many lessons to digest. All units and formations
compiled impressively detailed after-action
reports, including an analysis of "lessons
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learned," which Corps Headquarters
consolidated in two major papers; "The SetPiece Attack: Lessons from the Breakthrough
of the Hitler Line," and "Lessons of the Pursuit
from Melfa to Agnani." Early in June a full
scale training conference for LieutenantColonels and above met to discuss tactics for
the breakthrough and advance phases which
could then be practised and rehearsed for the
next operation. 28
Fifth CAD concluded there were both
tactical and organizational difficulties to correct.
The divisional staff, for example had to modify
its deployment drills. General Hoffmeister had

fought his battle from a small, detached tactical
headquarters (initially at least from a command
tank, which he soon abandoned for a jeep), but
it provided impractical to operate the
headquarters effectively for more than a short
period with a split staff.
Wireless
communications were unreliable (caused
partially by the high density of formations and
the consequent crowding of frequencies) and it
had not been possible to manage the passage
of information, up or down, during the fighting.
This applied equally to the CRA's headquarters,
which was undermanned in the best of
circumstances.
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The two principal organizational faults were
a shortage of sappers and infantry. An
armoured division had only two field squadrons
on establishment, yet its need for bridging and
mine clearing was proportionately greater than
an infantry division's. A strong case was made
for adding a third squadron, and this became
tied to a proposal for adding a second infantry
brigade. The need for additional infantry was
made particularly clear during the advance
from the Melfa when it proved impossible to
maintain momentum with just one infantry
brigade. There were too few troops either to
thicken the front to an appropriate width for
deploying armour, or to leapfrog brigades on a
narrower frontage to speed forward movement.
British armoured divisions in Italy began
to receive more infantry, and Burns pressed
Canadian headquarters in London for similar
reinforcement. After considerable discussion,
it was agreed, but with one major caveat; all the
units for the new brigade had to be found
within current Canadian Corps resources.
Twelve Canadian Infantry Brigade thus came
into existence on 13 July when General Burns
informed Brigadier D.C. Spry that he would
leave 1 CIB to take command of the new
formation. 29 The Westminsters became its first
battalion. The two others were converted from
other units; the Princess Louise Dragoon
Guards (PLDG) (1st Division reconnaissance
regiment) was one, the 1st Canadian Light
Anti-Aircraft Regiment, initially rebadged as
the 89th/ 109th Battalion, then as the Lanark
and Renfrew Scottish, the other. Additional
artillery, engineer and service units were found
among Corps troops.
It was clearly going to be no easy task to
form a new brigade headquarters and impose
control over such an ad hoc grouping. There
was little difficulty absorbing specialist troops,
for instance, the AGRA's [Army Group Royal
Artillery) 11th Field Regiment, but converting
PLDG troopers and anti-aircraft gunners
quickly to infantry did present problems.
Training had to begin back at the individual
level (tests of elementary training) before even
section let alone company tactics could be
practised or support weapons deployed. An
experienced infanteer, Lieutenant-Colonel W.C.
Dick moved from Brigade Major of 11 CIB to

command the Lanarks, but he can hardly have
been encouraged when the brigade's first
shipment of training pamphlets consisted of
150 copies of one for the long-gone Lewis gun.
Training, interrupted continually with
inevitable moves and housekeeping, was,
consequently, less than thorough. All units
did field firing, and each PLDG squadron
managed to complete a river crossing exercise
before the divisional staff put the brigade itself
through Exercise "Canyon," a simulated assault
crossing against a defended river obstacle.
This was done under a new commander,
BrigadierJ .S. Lind (Spry having been promoted
and sent to France). The following day, 18
August, units received their movement
instructions for Operation "Olive" - a full-scale
attack against the Gothic Line. There was no
more time for training; 5th Canadian Armoured
Division was needed on the battlefield. 30
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Coming in May!
The Spring 1994 issue of CMH will mark the 50th Anniversary of
Operation "Overlord" with a special section devoted to the Summer of
1944. Join us for new perspectives on the Normandy campaign.
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